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Ar~ersinger v . Hamlin - --- -Cert to Fla SC: Roberts , Drew , Thorna1 , Carlton ; dissenting : 
~QYQ , Ervin , Adkins 
Petr was arrested and charged with a misdemeanor punishable~ 
under Fla law by not less thanlt three and not more than 6 
l· 
months or by a fine not less than $500 and not more than $1000 . 
Petr pled guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of $500 , and 
in default of payment to be imprisoned for 3 months . lJe was 
indigent , and therefore was ordered to prison . 
With the assistance of an attorney , he filed for state 
habeas corpus the day after his sentence began . He was released 
on bail where he remains . His claim was that when he pled --- / 
guilty he was unrepresented but that he had not waived his 
right to assistance of counsel . He also claimed that he had 
CCDNTROLLING CASES : GIDeon v . Wainwright , 372 U. S . 335 (1963). 
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a defense to the charges against him , The Fla SC, by a 4-3 
vote, discharged the writ , It ruled that an indigent offender 
accused of a misdemeanor is entitled to court-appointed counsel 
only where the offense Jmi: with which he has been charged 
carries a possible penalty of more than 6 months imprisonment . 
Since petr was charged with a misdemanor which was not punishable 
by more than 6 months, he was not entitled to relief , Petr 
sought cert to this Court, and the Court granted , 
This is going to be , hopefully , a brief memo , because 
I do not think I can say anything here that will improve on 
the amicus brief filed by the SG in this case , I recommend 
that you read that brief and rely on it rather than the 
petr's brief x as your source for that side of the case , 
The right KNXB~~NXNKRNXN~MXX of indigents to have appointed 
Efg!KNXXR couns
1
Jl& was recognized by this Court in ~!R Gideon v . 
Wainwright , Although neither the reasoning nor the precise 
holding of the case is limited to felonies , Gideon had been 
convicted of a felony , It is therefore argued that the Court 
has not held that indigents are entitled to appointed counsel 
in mi.s:NN misdemeanor cases , The Fla SC and most of the persons 
supporting the state ' s position , do not argue that ax in all 
RlX.S:Na:nnRNH misdemeanor cases , there is no right to counsel . 
They instead , relying on the line drawn in Duncan v . Lousiana , 
391 U. S . 145 (1968) , and baldwin v , New York , 399 U. S . 66 (1970) , 
argue that there is no such right in non- serious cases , i . e ., 
cases in which the maximum~ imprisonment that can be imposed 
does not exceed 6 months , 
-3-
In the right-to-counsel precedents, there is little 
/;t/e ~ /4f? -~ ~. I 
kXE®M~ comfort forx~!R roop'o line , K.S:XXXKHXN+XKN!RXXN In 
the right-to-counsel area the Court has never taken an historical 
approach of trying to determine wNxxxkiNx in what kinds of 
cases counsel was afforded at the time the Constituti,an was 
- ---------- If \,\ 
written. It's approach has been fundamental fairness, Very 
simply put, it has held that the right to counsel goes to the 
integrety of the fact-finding function, and that atria~ in 
which the def end ant has been denied the right to counsel_J ~ .,u,-,r. 
It has never limited this reasoning according to whether the 
offense charged is serious or not. Indeed, there is substantial 
evidence for the proposition that the fact-finding process 
in non-serious cases requires the assistance of counsel to the 
same extent as does the fact-finding process in serious cases. 
There are some interesting figures cited in the arnicus brief 
of the Legal Aid Society of New York , at 16-18, which show 
that rix:NxKN!RXN.s:.s:xx:kHN~Rx~f in non-serious cases in which the 
society represents indigents in New York, it obtains either an . 
acquital or dismissal of charges 45% of the time, whereas in 
felonies, ix.s:xx!R it is successful only 9% of the time. This 
suggests that the occurance of errors is far more frequent in 
rAra.~ ni "-1 
the non-serious cases, and it is not xu strains judicial notice 
too far, I think, to E:©NN conclude that substantially less of 
these errors would have come to light had there been no assistance 
of counsel. Other studies could be, and indeed are, cited for 
the proposition that the quality of justice handed out by the 
lower criminal courts of this country ~~MXNX!R benefits fx@ when 
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the accused is represented . Over- burdened courts , often 
presided over by judges who are poorly trained , do not aid 
a def who is wi~ without assistance . Therefore , I think it 
is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that the system 
works better if the accused is represented in non-serious 
cases . 
In addition to this due process reason in XMf~~ support 
of the indir,ent's right to N~NM counsel, there is a quasi-
equal protection ~ - (Resp argues that this argument was 
not advanced in the court below and cannot therefore be raised 




acknowledgement at p 36 of petr ' s brief . I see no such 
acknowled~ement on that page . t'oreover , due process was clearly 
raised below, ~ I think that if this arguemtn is properly 
classified as an equal protection argument rather than a due 
process argument , that it is certainly on the hazy borderline 
between those two doctrines . Ihe Court has acknowledge that 
the concept of e~Jal protection is inherent in the fundamental 
fairness N~X concept of due process.) The arguemtn is simply 
that it is fundamentally MNfaxixx~ unfair to permit persons 
who can afford attorneys to be represented while persons who 
cannot afford them are not . In support of this argument , petr 
cites the ~riffin v . Illinois , 351 U. S . 12 (1956) , line of 
cases . 
Thus, petr is able to marshal two powerful constitutional 
' po ~ --i_e_s_ i_n __ f ... a_v,..o.._r;....,.o:.,:f:_,:t :,:h:..;.e....:r:.:i:,:g~h:.:,t,:_,:o.:f....:i:n.:.:d:.1.:· g'.:e=n~t~s~ t::,:o:.._:h::,:a.:.v.:e:_:a:_!p~p::;o:.::in t e d 
counsel in non-serious cases . There arc , however , counter 
- 5-
policies . 
The strongest of these is the argument that to appoint 
counsel in every misdemaenor case in which an indigent is 
unrepresented would be to place an insurmountable burden on 
the x judicial systems. RNx~xxxgiX~XKNRx~x~~~xixi~Nxx Resp 
cites the number of traffic offenses , or charges of jaywalking 
or spiiting on the sidewalk , in which counsel would have to 
be afforded . The state asserts that it would be imposiible 
for all these persons to be represented . Since due process 
often acquires a delicate balance E~~ between the rights of 
the accused and the interest of the state , it is not inappropriate 
. . b ~ l 1 .. to consider these logistical pro lems . t,J.groevCJ:: , t 1e ogistical 
argument also serves to refute the quasi-equal protection argu-
nori-serious 
ment advanced by petr . In most/cases, the potential liability 
is only a fine . It is often not worth while for persons who can 
afford one , to NXRXRxxxxa hire a lawyer; legal fees are likely 
to be higher than the potential fineJ But if an indigent has 
a right to appointed counsel , we would face the anomalous situ~tion 
in ~1ich all indigents would be represented because they could 
most 
have free assistance while/axx non-indigents would be unrepresented 
because it would not be ~ inteJligent to NiRx hire an 
attorney . Furthermore , resp argues , if indigents have a right 
to appointed counsel in all misdemeanor cases , why would they 
not also have the same right in xi civil caseso The potential 
liability in a civil case will often exceed the maximum fine 
-6 i~posable in a misdemanor case . If assistance is provided±N in 
the latter to protect the indigent ' s iNN interests , logic 
) 
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d ictates that assistance be provided in the former where the 
same or even greater interests are involved . But here the 
logistical problem wou1d truly prove insurmountable . 
t 
There is no denying the force to ~Rkx*xxaxg resp ' s logistical. 
arguments , but much of that force is dissipated by the rule 
suggested by the SC in his brief . He suggests that the right 
to counsel exist only in cases in which a sentence is imposed . 
If at the outsetx of the process , the judge believes that 
a conviction wil1 likeJy ~ a jail sentence , he must~ 
advise the def of his right to appointed counsel . This is 
essentially the rule proposed by the ABA , RE except that this 
one has an ad&itional wrinkle . The SG says that if N the 
offense is one which would not normally bring a sentence 
and if a judge , accordingly , does not offer an indigent appointed 
counsel , he cannot then later change his mind and sentence 
the man after all . Instead some other , as ~Ra yet unspecifie1 
procedur~ would have to be devised . XNXKXXNXRXKNEKRHNkixxx~xxx 
KNRXNXXXNNXKXN®WNX@NXKNRXX®5XKKXNHXX~XNMXRm 
The SG ' s proposed rule would ~~ry reduce the 
logistical problem by eliminating crimes like jaywalking 
from tho~ in which indigents must be furnished counsel . 
~N~R There is considerable~ reason to ExR± believe that the 
' 
remaining logistical problem would not be ixNNmaNgax unmanagable . 
Several states have comparable rules at the present , including 
New York and California . While New York is not the best 
example one could cite for efficiency , there is no reason to 
think that the appointment of counsel in non-serious misdemeanor 
( 
- 7-
cases contributes substantially to the problem. If New York 
can handle the problem, it is reasonable to assume that other 
states could. Indeed , Alaska in its amicus brief, endorses 
the sr•s rule. Seconc,l, the SG says that his rule would 
Qresent no insurmountable problem for the federal system . 
~ -Thira , wh ile the SG cannot :s:10exEk speak for the a states, he 
points out that the recent cases that have expanded the right 
./4)-a.~ 
to counsel ~o R that it app_:}*s in many other stages of the 
criminal process have not presented any insurmountable logistical 
n barrier. Finally , the ABA and a federal study have concluded 
I' that s irnilar rules are feasible . 
:s:e~mXK~XNiKXRXXNXlOXXKXENXXXXXX It is reasonable to assume that 
the ABA in particular was not unaware of the magnitude of 
resulting logistica;ei problemso 
The t SG's rule is also the answer to the argument of 
resp that if indigents have a right to counsel in all misdemeanor 
cases, they must have such a right in all civil cases. 
~1 
R~x the SG's rule distinguislhes a situation where there is a 
pssibility of imprisonment from those in which the only penalty 
is f±Naprn financial . This distinguishes the ~x±ml::NiK civil cases. -
While it, like all rules, is not x~~xx10exfREK perfect--there 
may be some cases in which the financial interest at stake 
is af higher imporaance than the possibility of a few days in 
jail, although it is difficult to think of such a case involving 
indigents--it does seem both workable and effective in removing 
the inet!{l.lities. As a general rule, the thing we think unfair 
._ 8-
is the possibility of going to jail without having been 
represented . The magnitude of the unfairness is diminished 
where the only penalty is monetary . 
There is one solid workability argument advance against 
the SC's position by the state of Virginia in its amicus brief . 
\l 
It says that in cases where :i1iuiigHNKxx indigents are fined 
and cannot or will not pay the fine , they are sent to jail . 
Therefore it argues that there is a possibilty of jail in almost 
every case . That is not an easy objection to answer . It i~ 
of course:N; not before XNXXXE the Court in this case . (It is 
true that petr was sentenced to jail because he could not pay 
a fine , but the charge involved in this case , carrying a concealed 
weapon , is one that would N~xm.axjqq::xixaxx1~.nniR:. often , I a s sume , 
L 
resu1tx in a sentence , so under the SG's rule , petr would have 
- --f.evr, ~ o-/ ¼ J 
~ Aright to appointed counsel . ) Moreover , ~ ase 
presents itself , I think there is a possible avenue of distinction . 
} 
I~ that ~ jail sentences imposed in lieu of fines could 
be analagized to contempt or something 1 ike it . Then you migh_t , 
a say that he was sent to jail not beaause he violated the 
\ 
criminal statute , but because he failed to pay his fine and was 
therefore in contempt . But even if there is no distinction , 
I do not think that the problem is insurmountable . In reality 
theec are going to be very few cases in which the fine is so 
large and the defendant so poorx: that he cannot pay it . Most 
of the EHX!R kinds of misdemeanors we are talking aboltlt--jaywalking 
or traffic violations--do not involve fines of $500 such as was 
imposed in this case . Moreo~er , in its opinion of last term , 
lOl U .S. 395 (1971), the Court ruled that it 
gal to automatically send a man to jail because he 
was too poor to pay his fineo It said that alternatives, such -as installment payments, had to be tried first. Only then if 
the rnan still could not or would not pay, could he be sent 
Thus , in the future there should 
fewer of these cases.m So even if the rule 
be xi&s::s:x@fx:trnx 
lfi__ h 1.· f must r t .at 
the fine cannot be paid and the def is then sent to jail, he 
had a right to counsel, the rule :s: will still clear w away a 
lot of the minor cases in which jail sentences, as a prai.ctical 
matter, are N!RXi&xximJO@:S:!RNX not a realistic possibility. 
I 
One benefit that might result from such a rule, incidentally, 
is the elimination of a lot of criminal statutes ·that are not 
properly criminal matters. I do not know what one could call 
them, if not crimes, blta lot of traffic ©ff!RN:S:XR offensese 
E@NNX could be better handled by a process that did not invoke 
all the cumbersome mechanisms of the criminal law. A rule 
such as that suggested by the SG, might encourage states to 
redefine a lot of "crimes." 
Thus, I would concll.iAf that striking the logistical balance, 
k~.,tks-1,:t,,4 ~1--~ 
under the s---mfggested r~w~ the interest of indigents 
in obtaining a fair ttial, would result in a holding that 
indigents have a right to N@N@N counsel in all cases in which 
they are sent to jailo That is rdally th guts of this 
1/4 017-f? 
but therela.Fs a fsJ incidentai.1 :s- issues that need to be treated • 
.. fir.:,)' /.;.esp argues that~ the line for right ©K to appointed 
;'•, 
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counsel xbus1N« should be drawn at offenses punishable by not 
more than 6 months because that is the line drawn in the jury 
cases. The right to counsel like the right to a jury trial is 
a part of the 6th Amenmento If kNHXRxixxNNxxi~NKXRNxaxtNx~ 
the 6th Amen~ ent does not require a right to a jury in a case, 
/I 
it ought not require the H}slJslNXlnnnR appointment of counsel. 
This argument assumes that the Court adopted :Mr. Justice Black's 
position of total incorporation of the Bill of Rights into 
the 14th Amenment. B~t the Court did not adopt that position. 
It selectively incorporated according to what it fx felt were 
the dictates of fundamental fairness. And i:x it turns out that 
the reasons for incorporating some part of the 6th Amenmcnt 
do not apply to others. for example, the right to a jury trial 
does not, at least to the same extent, reflect the policy 
behihd the right to counsel which± is that without the assistance 
of counsel, the integrety of the fact-finding process is weakened. 
\ 
This is why the right to a jury trial was not made retroactice, 
while the right to counsel was. Thus, all the parts of the 6th' 
the f ac*'E t hat 
amendment do not have the same force, so/xNaxxwNi:x!R a jury may 
not be required in non-serious misdemeanor trials does not 
necessarily mean that counsel. is not required. It is very doubtful 
that the Court would tolerate limiting the other rights 
guaranteed by the 6th Amendment NXK~XN~NKS:i&XXNNxx«ax!R--right to 
speedy trial, right to public trial, right to know nature and 
cause of accusation, right to confront witnesses, right to 
compel favorable witnesses--to serious offenses. fN For one 
thing, the logistical problems that are claimed to exist in 
-11-
this case , and which certainly would exist if juries were 
required in non-serious offenses , do not exist if the right 
to confront witnesses , for example , is guaranteed in non-
serious cases . Thus, in the case of each right , a balance 
must be struck . In this case , as I have already argued , 
the balance should be struck in favor of the right . 
(Although I promised , j o tbe paragraph bsfor"9 last , that _.(;.:.:>....._ 
.,.t;hcrc were a"few" tncidental issues that needed treating , '<-__ 
I reverse myself ;;ind limit the di:3cussiot1 to the one in ,9______ 
th@ last paragraph , J Q 
In conc1usion , let me reiterate that ki::::s: this is really 
a balancing case--the interest of the accused in counsel 
vs . the interest of the state in efficieny . I think that the 
sr•s rule offers a proper method of striking that balance . 
REVERSE Fox 
r •. : ,. 
Conf. 2/25/72 
Court ................... . l'oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
j,1tprtmc <.qcnrl cf tlrt ~ttitdt .§tat.ts 
'J]tir1-u.llrhtghm. tI}. <.q. 20~)!-~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
March 2, 1972 
/ 
Re: No. 70 -r 015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Dear Chief: 
I have devoted further attention to this case. 
I write this note merely to let you know that my vote, 
this time around, remains just as tentative and just as 
unsure as it was in December. I am particularly con-
cerned, of course, because mine seems to be the swing 
vote, and at the moment I feel I could draw the line 
either at imprisonment or at the six-month mark. The 
latter has the obvious advantage of relating to Baldwin. 
It is possible that I shall come to rest only after some-
thing is written out. 
Facetiously, one might conclude to send this 
case back because of the Boykin error and let it go at 
that. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 






JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Bill: 
j;u:µutttt QJomt af Urt 'Jlfuildi ~tctit.e-
'Jjl a:s qiugton. l'J. QJ. 2llffeJl-.;l 
March 27, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Although your draft opinion is persuasive, I am not yet 
persuaded to change my vote. Accordingly, I now plan to write 
something. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
lfp/ss 4/3/72 1cc 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Hamilton Fox DATE: April 3, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Your draft opinion of 4/1/72 is great - well written and well 
reascmed. 
I will, of course, do some revisions because lawyers are 
incapable of accepting something another lawyer writes without changing 
it. The result in this case will probably not be as good. 
I would appreciate your seeing whether additional facts are 
available as follows: 
The majority relies on a single study (as I understand it) to 
the effect that fewer than 2300 lawyers will be needed to accommodate 
all indigent petty crime cases. You translate this into $23, 000, 000 
assuming $10,000 per year. The minimum charge per hour .. prescribed ~ 
by any state law with which I am familiar or in any law office - is 
$15. 00. If you assume 30 hours per week - which is certainly a 
minimum in litigation - my arithmetic results in $22, 500 per lawyer. 
If public defenders were used, perhaps you would not have to pay this 
much on the average. The starting minimum wage for lawyers in 







~ . , .. 
" ; 
2. 
But I question the basis assumption that 2300 lawyers would be 
adequate or that the cost would be as low as even my figures would 
project. 
You might do the following: (i) read, if you have not done so, 
the article relied upon by the majority and see how solid it looks; (ii) 
obtain the actual figures appropriated by the Congress for the OEO 
Legal Services Program, going back to the first year 1965 and record 
the steady increase in the requests and the appropriations - which 
all of .us who worked with that program considered inadequate; (iii) 
see if there are studies by NLADA as to the increase in cost on a 
national basis of legal aid - both private and state provided - prior 
to and since Gideon; and (iv) take a look at the briefs in No. 71-11 
I 
( James v. Strange). My recollection is that these briefs will reveal -
perhaps the record does too - that Kansas spent about $600, 000 a year 
providing indigent services 1n felony cases, an amount which has been 
increasing annually. The FBI shows the number of felonies in each , 
state in its annual reports. It may show the number of misdemeanors, 
although I doubt this. If one compared the number of felonies committed 
In Kansas, and the cost per felony for this legal service, you might 
\ 
come up with a figure to be applied nationally. This would be w~ on 







not a high crime state as compared with many others. Whether this 
sort of analysis is worth the trouble is a debatable question. I 
certainly would not spend any large amount of time on it. The cost 
problem is not what concerns me most, but 1 am convinced that reliance 
upon the single study - cited in the majority opinion - presents an 
unrealistic assessment of costs. 
The consequences of the majority's position which concern me 
the most are (a) the impact on the smaller communities, with all of 
their diversity across the county; and (b) the impact on the criminal 
justice system primarily 1n terms of aggravating the already acute 
problem of "delayed justice" and intolerable cOJj-estion in court dockets 
at all levels. On this latter polbl - which 1s the single most important 
one in my thinking - I hope you can find some statistics which reflect 
the impact of Gideon in these respects.. I retlize that statistics do not 
measure any single cause of the present overburdened condition of 
the system. Decisions of this Court have certainly contributed 
singificantly. But I suspect that the real "watershed" was Gideon 
(which I firmly support), but which has created problems which the 
system has not yet managed to master. As you and I have discussed 
·.• .. 
'•· ,. 













young lawyers recieve most of the appointments ( except where public 
defenders are provided); they are fresh out of law school, full of the 
latest constitutional ''wisdom"; they are eager to make a reputation; 
they often have plenty of time; and, when paid on a hourly basis by the 
state, this is lucrative and attractive work. The result is that the 
simplest felony case, often without a truly substantive issue, may be 
litigated all the way to the United States Supreme Court - a,t just 
once but 10 or 20 times through state and federal habeas corpus. 
I am sure studies are available somewhar~ possibly through 
the Administrative Office of the Federal Court. I have seen references 
to studies on the escalating flood of habeas corpus petitions, but this 
is only a part of the story. 
While the experience in felony cases is not completely analagou.s, it 
is the best indication of what is likely to be the overburdening of the 
system ... in terms of delay frivcilous defenses, petitions and appeals. 
I have one or two other ideas but we can talk about these. 





lfp/ ss lee 4/7 /72 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Hamilton Fox DATE: April 7, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: Argersinger v. Hamlin No. 70-5015 
Here is your first draft, with a certain number of suggested 
changes and with a couple of fairly verbose riders. 
I would appreciate your developing a secood draft, which tries 
to blend together - both in substance and sty le - our respective 
contributions. Feel free, as always, to change my verbiage and 
challenge my reasoning. 
Specific points - some quite minor - which have occurred to 
me include the following: 
1. My terminology is not always consistent. I think you used 
the term "petty" offenses, and I sometimes used both petty and 
misdemeanor offenses. Perhaps it would be well - near the outset -
to define petty offenses a little more specifically than you have at 
present. This might be done in a footnote, which might also refer to 
18 U.S. C. § 1 defining petty offenses under federal law. 
Another example of inconsistent terminology is my use of 




If there are any ground rules here as to how one should refer to the 
prevailing opinion, feel free to make the necessary changes. 
2. 
2. The Douglas draft makes some use of lower federal and 
state court decisions. I am aware of a conflict (see ABA Standards 
on "providing defense services" pp. 38 and 39 ), and wonder whether 
we have anything to gain by citing any of these cases. 
I 
3. &ilould we not make some reference to the fact that a number 
of istates, by statute, have extended the right to counsel into the mis-
1" 
/ 
1demeanor categories? I aave not looked at any of these statutes. I 
wooder whether we could derive support from any of them for our view 
that it is unnecessary to create a new, arbitrary constitutional line. 
Perhaps, as a minimum, we might refer to state statutes as an example 
of one way to deal with this problem without imposing on all 50 states 
a new hard and fast rule? 
4. In discussing cost, would it not be well to note .. without 
emphasis - that paying for counsel at the first trial stage is only one 
element. Counsel will be required in all subsequent stages. In 
addition a transcript of the evidence will have to be made, preserved 
and made available to the accused. This would be quite impossible 
in many misdemeanor courts in the smaller communities across the 
country, where neither recording facilities nor stenographers are 
available. 
I 













5. I am still tempted to include, at least in a footnote, the 
SG' s suggestion that - in view of the obvious burden even his rule 
would impose oo the legal profession - the requirement could be met 
by using social workers and clergymen. If you have the time, take a 
look at the transcript of the SG's argument. It seems to me that this 
suggestion ccntradicts the basic premise that lawyers are needed. 
I think the average defendant would be better off with no lawyer than 
with the average social worker or clergyman - at least that would be 
my own decision. 
6. We have discussed Section 11 of your draft, and how you will 
restructure it. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
; 
